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RULE 10b-5 AS AN ADAPTIVE ORGANISM
DONALD C. LANGEVOORT*
In this Article, ProfessorLangevoort examines the adaptive qualities of
Rule 10b-5 and how the rule has remained intact despite sweeping
changes in the intellectual and political landscapesin which it operates.
In Professor Langevoort's view, Rule lOb-5s survival is largely due to
the flexibility of its language which has enabled the rule to embrace
malleable social perceptions of the securities market and the securities
business.
ProfessorLangevoort also addresses the question of whether Rule l0b-5
has outlived its usefulness andshould therefore be repealedand replaced
by more precisely-drafted legislation. Professor Langevoort concludes
that Rule lOb-Ss continued survival is indeed appropriate in light of
society's incomplete understanding of how investors make decisions
ProfessorLangevoortfurther concludes that a complete revision of Rule
10b-5 is highly unlikely-in part because the ambiguity of the rule's
present languageprovides an attractive alternative to the difficult riskallocationdecisions that would have to be made by lawmakers in formulating substitute legislation.
INTRODUCTION

M

ETAPHORS abound in descriptions of Rule l0b-5. Justice Rehnquist's portrayal of the rule as a "judicial oak that has grown from
little more than a legislative acorn" 1 is undoubtedly the best known.
Continuing in the genre of the natural sciences, I would like to draw the
Darwinian image of Rule lOb-5 as an organism readily adapting to
changes in both its cultural and political ecology. The rule's unique
adaptive capacity at the very least explains why it has survived intact for
some fifty years, and gives us reason to doubt that revision will occur at
any time in the foreseeable future.
The attribution of a fluid character to Rule lOb-5 is not a novel insight.
The rule has long been praised as being sufficiently open ended so as to
avoid presenting a blueprint for fraud, tempting the "'versatile inventions of fraud-doers.' "2 Its lines are sufficiently indistinct that a cunning
operator cannot confidently step close but not over. The rule can also
readily reach new schemes and tactics. However, while flexibility is
plainly a virtue from an enforcer's perspective, the price of indeterminacy
is obvious: a loss of notice that permits legitimate actors to behave in a
* Lee S. and Charles A. Speir Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University.
1. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975). For other
metaphors, see Louis Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation 726 (2d ed. 1988).
2. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 199 (1963) (quoting
Stonemets v. Head, 154 S.W. 108, 114 (Mo. 1913)); see id at 193 n.41 (discussing flexibility of definition of fraud in equity jurisprudence).
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manner unchilled by the fear of legal liability. That sort of adaptability,
while true, is not what especially interests me.

Rather, my claim is intellectually more basic. Over the course of time,
American society (or at least its relevant segments) has told a multitude
of stories about the way in which the world of securities and investments
works-who its actors are, why they behave as they do, and the mix of

function and dysfunction, good and evil. This socially constructed image

of the investing "reality" 3 has evolved considerably since the 1940s, and
continues to change today. What is both intriguing and important about
this development is the extent to which Rule 1Ob-5 so easily embraces
new ideas and images about investing that achieve some level of elite
social consensus, yet just as quickly abandons them without serious damage when these new ideas lose currency. This strikes me as evincing a
much more powerful adaptive capacity than the simple ability to reach
new forms of fraud. In sum, Rule lOb-5 is remarkably well suited to
operate as a centerpiece in securities regulation precisely because we as a
culture have not yet created a consistent, persuasive story of what the

business of investing is all about.
I.

STORIES ABOUT INVESTING

As individuals, each of us has some direct access to information about
the investment process: our own experiences in buying or selling securities, the experiences of friends or family in such matters, or perhaps
through our own personal contacts with someone in the securities business.4 From these highly biographical bits of data, we can mentally construct skeletal stories about the investing process-a term which this
Article uses to describe the entire range of actors, institutions and phenomena bound up in the trading of securities. But, apart from those "in
the business," few individuals have the base of experience to build anything close to a coherent explanation about what the investing process
entails, and those in the industry often have perspectives that are exceedingly subjective and potentially misleading.' The process of "social
3. Social constructionism is an intellectual genre that emphasizes the socially-invented nature of much of what we consider knowledge. The seminal work on this subject
is Peter L. Berger & Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise
in the Sociology of Knowledge (1967). An effort to draw on this literature in the analysis
of legislative process is set forth in Edward Rubin, Beyond Public Choice: Comprehensive
Rationality in the Writing and Reading of Statutes, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 4 (1991).
4. This Article uses the term "socially-constructed reality" to refer to the ways that
people collectively make sense of the external world and explain it to others. More formally, such cognitive maps are frequently referred to as schemas-sets of mental representations that provide interpretive guidance in the presence of ambiguous stimuli. See
Susan T. Fiske & Shelley E. Taylor, Social Cognition 98 (2d ed. 1991).
5. As social psychologists often point out, that which is relevant to our personal
experience is typically overweighed in creating an understanding of the world at large.
As a result, for example, a stockbroker who works in a highly stressful but highly ethical
environment is likely to see the securities business in that light, and treat wrongdoers as
aberrant. This tendency to overweigh personal experience (egocentric reasoning) is the
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learning" completes the image;6 our perceptions about the investing process are shaped through our education, accounts presented by the media,
the books and articles that we read, our conversations with others, and so
on. The interplay between personal and external sources of information
varies considerably among people, and hence each of our stories will dif-

fer considerably. Legal academics, for instance, draw from different (but
probably no less biased) information sources than both practicing lawyers and laypeople. 7 In the aggregate, however, common themes,
images, and ideologies can and do emerge in people's construction of the
investing process.
The substantive content of our constructed reality changes with mod-

erate velocity. To some extent, it will at any given time reflect objective
fact-for example, the highly institutionalized nature of the current market for large stocks and the growing internationalization of the marketplace as a result of rapid changes in the technology of market-linkages
color our perspective of the investing process as it exists in 1993. Nevertheless, the current scholarship on constructed realities points to the important role that motivational influences play.' For example, cultural
attitudes are shaped by emotional forces-such as ego, greed and envythat in turn will reflect, among other things, social and economic status.9
Aggregate changes in relative status, or in perception about relative sta-

tus, will alter prevailing attitudes in both the subjective construction of

the investing process, and in social learning about this process.' 0 Levels
of executive compensation that might be seen as a dynamic form of marketplace incentive in an expanding economy have a very different meaning in a persistent recession." In this sense, the social reality possesses a

strong political component. Indeed, the social reality may be discernable
more through iconography than through econometrics.
basis, it is said, for much human misunderstanding. For an intriguing article, see Dale
W. Griffin & Lee Ross, Subjective Construal, Social Inference and Human Misunderstanding, 24 Advances in Experimental Soc. Psychol. 319 (1991).
6. The pervasiveness of social learning-the tendency to look to others who might
have superior knowledge to help interpret ambiguous cues-has received ample empirical
support. See, eg., Elliot Aronson, The Social Animal, chs. 3-4 (6th ed. 1992); Robert B.
Cialdini, Influence: Science and Practice, ch. 4 (2d ed. 1988).
7. The unavailability and the ambiguity of empirical data, coupled with the professional distance that most legal academics maintain from the day-to-day workings of the
worlds they study, lead to a high-and circular-reliance on social learning (the pronouncements of colleagues, etc.) and hence a substantial risk of bias.
8. See Aronson, supra note 6, at 202-03; Anthony G. Greenwald, The Totalitarian
Ego: Fabricationand Revision of Personal History, 35 Am. Psychol. 603 (1980). These

influences include the desire to view oneself as the focus of knowledge, the desire to view
positive-but not negative-outcomes as a result of one's actions, and the desire to preserve one's preconceived notions about the way the world works. See Greenwald, supra,
at 603. They also encompass one's desire to view oneself as possessing a truthful character. See Aronson, supra note 6, at 202.
9. See Aronson, supra note 6, at 202-03; Greenwald, supra note 8, at 603.
10. See Aronson, supra note 6, at 202-03; Greenwald, supra note 8, at 603.
11. See Aronson, supra note 6, at 202-03; Greenwald, supra note 8, at 603.
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Since judges make the law of Rule lOb-5, their aggregate perspectives
are crucial. Moreover, since the pool of federal judges is highly atypical-dominantly white, male, and relatively wealthy-we must tread
carefully in discerning their construction of reality. Undoubtedly, judicial attitudes have been shaped by both the judges' personal investment
experiences and contacts over the course of their careers with the investing process. Justice Powell, for instance, had an exceptionally strong influence on the securities law jurisprudence of the 1980s; unmistakably,2
his attitudes reflect his years as a "white shoe" corporate counsellor.,
Judges, however, are also subject to the perhaps disproportionate influence of elite external sources of information, including conversations
with other elites, articles appearing in the New York Times and the Wall
Street Journal,and sometimes even academic writings. I3 Their views are
bound to be more sophisticated, and less volatile, than those of the public
at large. Nevertheless, they are by no means static.
Before turning to Rule lOb-5 for illustrations, we might profitably look
at the recent takeover phenomenon for a salient example of the coincidence between elite economic perspectives and the prevailing case lawin this instance, as a matter of state law. Up through the mid-1970s,
there was at best an ambivalence about takeover bids, and the term
"raider" was often used to describe the takeover bidder. 4 Then, in a
dramatic turnaround in ideology that would prevail throughout most of
the 1980s-perhaps attributable to the stunning premiums being paid to
investors-the prevailing commentary departed from its earlier stance
and embraced takeovers for both their efficiency and wealth-creating effects.15 Since then, for a variety of reasons, criticism has been reascendent. The law regarding the scope of discretion given to management
to resist a takeover can be plotted in a way that shows an identical pattern: from the business-judgment approach of the late 1960s,' 6 through
the heavy judicial scrutiny signalled in Delaware by the Unocal and Rev12. See Catherine A. Barnes, Men of the Supreme Court: Profiles of the Justices 119
(1978). This is particularly evident in his opinions on corporate takeovers. See, e.g., CTS
Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69 (1987); Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457
U.S. 624, 646 (1982) (Powell, J., concurring in part).
13. This is not to say that judges are particularly influenced directly by academic
writings, although they may be in certain instances. But, academic writing at some level
does diffuse into cultural understandings through a variety of means, especially if there is
a political demand for particular points of view. See Martha Derthick & Paul J. Quirk,
The Politics of Deregulation 246 (1985).
14. The late 1960s brought both federal and state regulation of bidder activity. See
Robert C. Clark, Corporate Law §§ 13.3-.5 (1986). The normative skepticism is nicely
captured in the title of one of the leading business articles of the time, Russell A. Taussig
& Samuel L. Hayes, III, Are Cash Take-Over Bids Unethical?, Fin. Analysts J., Jan.-Feb.
1967, at 107.
15. The classic article in this genre is Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The
ProperRole of a Target'sManagement in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 Harv. L. Rev.
1161 (1981).
16. See, e.g., Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548 (Del. 1964).
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Ion cases in the early and mid-1980s,' 7 followed by the dramatic retrenchment in the Time case in 1989.18 While the causal relationship
between perception and doctrine cannot be proved, the inference is hard
to resist. 19

II. RULE lOb-5 AND THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCT OF INVESTMENT
Lacking both the time and experience to consider the entire fifty years
of Rule lOb-5's intellectual history, this Article will concentrate in this
section on its latter half-roughly from 1968 to the present. The methodology will be straightforward, if speculative:2" first, this Article will
recreate as much as possible the changing views of the investing process
that were reflected in elite sources of information (as well as objective
fact), and then it will examine the extent to which the law under Rule
lOb-5 has mirrored these shifts in perception.
The literature and expressions of the first phase of this period was
dominated by the sense-growing obsolete, even then-of the individual
nature of investing. The 1960s especially reflected broad household participation in the securities markets. The characterization of stock ownership was very much in the Berle/Means genre of dispersed individual
owners largely powerless in the presence of entrenched managerialism.
So stated, the general concern of securities regulation-and the antifraud
rules, in particular-was essentially consumer protection to be accomplished through full disclosure, mediated by an aggressive use of legal
17. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985); Revlon,
Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1985). Both cases held
that defensive efforts should be subjected to an "intermediate" standard of review, with
management bearing the burden of demonstrating a threat to the company and a considered, proportionate response thereto. See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954-55; Revlon, 506 A.2d
at 180.
18. See Paramount Comm. Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989) (applying
the intermediate standard of review, but giving wide scope to defensive efforts based on
little more than a potentially self-serving business preference for an in-place acquisition
program).
19. This claim was ably advanced in Jeffrey N. Gordon, Corporations Markets and
Courts, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 1931 (1991). Elsewhere, I have argued that the Supreme
Court jurisprudence on the legitimacy of state statutory regulation of takeovers has been
heavily affected by changes in intellectual perception. See Donald C. Langevoort, The
Supreme Court and the Politics of Corporate Takeovers: A Comment on CTS Corp. v.
Dynamics Corp. of America, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 96, 102-03 (1987).
20. Reconstructing the past for purposes of intellectual history is a difficult task, in
part because of the revisionist tendencies of collective memory. I have not systematically
sought to review the entire popular and academic literature, if indeed that by itself would
demonstrate a historically valid description of the prevailing social construct. However, I
have a fair degree of intuitive confidence in the description, and it coincides with mainstream accounts of the history of investing and securities regulation, and with collections
of legal materials of the times. See, eg., Joel Seligman, The Transformation of Wall
Street (1982) (a history of SEC regulation); Robert C. Clark, The FourStages of Copitalism: Reflections on Investment Management Treatises, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 561 (1981) (providing a history of the shifting roles of investment).
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institutions. 2 Intellectually, this period was dominated by the first great
scholars of securities regulation, particularly Louis Loss.2 2
In this environment, Rule lOb-5 flourished. Nineteen sixty-eight was
the year of the Second Circuit's Texas Gulf Sulphur decision,2 3 perhaps
the watershed event in the rule's history. There, the court not only established Rule lOb-5 as the principal weapon against insider trading, but
even more significantly, authorized sanctions against issuers who do not
tell the public the entire truth, unencumbered by notions of privity or
near-privity.24 Three years later, in Superintendentof Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co.,25 the Supreme Court rendered its first decision
under Rule lOb-5, with the same consumer protection flavor.2 6
The later 1970s were a transition period, characterized by doctrinal
retrenchment at least in the Supreme Court. 27 It is easy to ascribe political motivations to this process of curtailment, which represents a more
business-oriented perspective on the potential for abuse in class and derivative litigation. Three other factors were perhaps just as significant.
The first was the intellectual environment, which saw a dramatic increase
in the dissemination of conservative points of view concerning the "excesses" of securities regulation within the intellectual media (e.g., books,
law reviews, and the business press).28 This reflected a natural classical
impulse: the desire to impose order and restraint on a doctrine that had
grown, in a burst of creativity, from little more than the desire to help the
fragile investor. The 1970s, then, saw less coherence, and more dissonance, in the constructed reality available to the judiciary.
The second factor-extending well beyond securities law-was a
growing disillusionment with ostensibly protective institutional structures. Much of the 1970s was marked by attacks on the stock exchanges
as anti-competitive cartels that existed for the benefit of its members, and
not the public. 29 The SEC as a bureaucracy, and the legal doctrines girding the existing system, were increasingly seen in shades of gray rather
than black or white.
21. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (en
banc) (articulating a rule of disclose or abstain with regard to inside information), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
22. See generally Louis Loss, Securities Regulation (2d ed. 1961 & Supp. 1969).
23. See Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 833.
24. See id. at 860-61.
25. 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
26. See id. at 12.
27. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (imposing deception requirement); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (imposing scienter requirement); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (imposing
purchaser-seller requirement for private rights of action).
28. I do not wish to suggest any sense of orchestrated intellectual manipulation. The
work of some of securities regulation's most notable scholars during the early 1970se.g., Alan Bromberg, Louis Lowenfels, David Ruder, Robert Mundheim-fell into this
moderately conservative, or classical, genre.
29. See Seligman, supra note 20, at 398; Gregg A. Jarrell, Change at the Exchange:
The Causes and Effects of Deregulation, 27 J.L. & Econ. 273 (1984).
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The final-and perhaps most subtle-factor was the shift in the pattern of investing from the individual to the institution. By the 1970s,
elite sources of information discovered what for some time had been a
trend-the increasing tendency of households to invest through intermediaries, such as pension funds and mutual funds. Fewer people saw
themselves as active investors, and the prevailing characterization of the
investing process placed less emphasis on consumerism, and more emphasis on the movements of large blocks of capital to which individual
trades seemed mere appendages. 3 ° In many ways, the distance between
people and securities grew.
The late 1970s and early 1980s brought the most fundamental intellectual change of the last twenty-five years of securities regulation: the shift
in emphasis from legal institutions to the free market as the primary
mechanism for protecting the investor. Building on the concerns about
market structure that were echoed in the 1970s 31 (which led to the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975),32 economists and legal scholars began

in earnest to identify a myriad of contexts in which investors would

seemingly be better off through a decrease in regulation.3 3 Central to this

endeavor was the efficient market hypothesis: the view, strongly endorsed by a growing body of research, that the financial markets operated in ways that impounded new information almost instantly into stock
prices, such that the prevailing price could-absent fraud-be trusted as
35
the correct price. 34 Soon, as I have described in some detail elsewhere,
this idealization of the market quickly diffused from academia to a variety of other settings, including the law.
The effect of the efficient market hypothesis upon Rule lOb-5 has been
quite dramatic. The efficient market hypothesis has provided the intellectual underpinning for the so-called "fraud on the market theory"-the
idea that investors can recover damages in instances of corporate fraud
even without a showing of actual reliance on the misstatement or omis-

sion, under the presumption that the investors relied on the integrity of
30. The classic exposition of this change is Clark, supra note 20, at 576, who described this as the "third" phase of capitalism. The fourth phase involves even further
distance, as the individual loses even the control over the investment adviser. See id. at
579.
31. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
32. Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, 15 U.S.C. § 78(b)-(d) (1988).
33. Early on, Henry Manne labored almost alone in legal academia, building on the
work of economists like George Benston and George Stigler. Later, he was joined by a
host of scholars, of whom the most notable have been (now Judge) Frank Easterbrook
and Daniel Fischel. Today, it is fair to say that nearly all significant work in theoretical
securities regulation-that of scholars like Roberta Romano, Ronald Gilson, Reinier
Kraakman, John Coffee, Lucien Bebchuk, Jon Macey, Geoffrey Miller, Ian Ayres, Lynn
Stout, Jeffrey Gordon, Bernard Black, and the like--operates from an efficiency paradigm, even though there is substantial disagreement regarding the appropriate conclusions within that framework.
34. See Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions, and Securities Regulation:
Market Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. Pa. L. Rev. 851, 851 (1992).
35. See id at 873-903.
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the market price (i.e., market efficiency) when they bought or sold their
investments. 6 Curiously, this use of economic theory expanded rather
than contracted the scope of liability. In fact, the elite's cultural embrace

of finance theory in adopting the efficient market hypothesis-acting as
though economics had made the presumption of reliance a doctrinal inevitability-may have blinded the courts to the costs associated with expanded liability. The literature is only now beginning to take notice of
this.3 7
Two other "deregulatory" uses of market efficiency under Rule lOb-5

were also quite noticeable. In the law of insider trading, the Supreme

Court's decisions in Chiarellav. United States38 and Dirks v. Securities &
Exchange Commission 39 were heavily influenced by the Court's desire to
recognize the ability of some market participants-especially investment

analysts-to exploit informational advantages free of the chill of the rule,
under the assumption that such exploitation is at the heart of market
efficiency and therefore is of value to all investors.'

The other significant use of the efficient market hypothesis has been in
the development of a theory converse to the fraud on the market theory,
sometimes called the "truth on the market theory." Underpinning this
theory is the idea that an investor should not be able to state a claim
under Rule 10b-5--even though he or she may have been plainly
deceived by misinformation-unless the market as a whole was also
deceived. 4 Under this approach, a showing by econometric data that
the market has discounted the fraud will bar all investors from recover-

ing for the fraud.42

Although the case law under Rule lOb-5 has not yet clearly demon-

strated it, we may be near-if not at-the end of the market idealization
phase. During the late 1980s, economists became increasingly skeptical
36. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241-47 (1988).
37. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Good Finance, Bad Economics: An Analysis of the Fraud-on-the-MarketTheory, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 1059 (1990). It is

particularly interesting that legal and economics scholars who have assailed securities
regulation as excessive and chilling have nevertheless tended to embrace the fraud on the
market theory with unbridled enthusiasm, as though they were asserting some sort of
intellectual parentage. See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel, Efficient Capital Markets, the Crash,
and the Fraudon the Market Theory, 74 Cornell L. Rev. 907 (1989).

38. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
39. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
40. See Daniel R. Fischel, Insider Trading and Investment Analysts: An Economic
Analysis of Dirks v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 13 Hofstra L. Rev. 127 (1984).
41. See In re Apple Computer Sec. Litig., 886 F.2d 1109 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
496 U.S. 943 (1990); Wielgos v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 892 F.2d 509 (7th Cir.
1989). The truth on the market theory is largely uncontroversial in principle, because if
in fact the market has not been fooled, then the price at which the deceived investor
traded was not an unfair one. The difficulty arises in determining whether the market
was indeed fooled, and the courts in both Apple and Wielgos have presumed that the
market was efficient. See Langevoort, supra note 34, at 905-09.
42. See Langevoort, supra note 34, at 904.
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of strong claims of financial market efficiency.4 3 In the wake of this skepticism, "noise" theorists have begun to develop credible alternative models of investor behavior that recognize the role played by mood swings
and other "irrational" phenomena in determining the price of a security.' Moreover, in the aftermath of the insider trading and manipulation scandals involving Ivan Boesky and Michael Milken, the stock
market crash of 1987, and the recession, the social and political environ-

ment has become increasingly suspicious of the markets themselves.4 5

It is possible, therefore, that we are at the beginning of another shift in

the jurisprudence of Rule lOb-5. In light of the general public's diminished direct participation in equity investing," this shift in jurisprudence
may perhaps be toward greater moralism and the assessment of blame on
those who hold immense economic power and status. This shift, however, would most likely be unaccompanied by the pretense of an "investor as consumer" analogy in light of the unalterable nature of today's
institutional marketplace for corporate securities.47 The process of adaptation in the jurisprudence of Rule lOb-5 is constant; it is only the direction of this adaptation that is difficult to discern.
III.

THE NORMATIVE QUESTION, AND THE LAWYERS' BET

As this Article earlier discussed, Rule lOb-5 can and does adapt to
changeable social perceptions of the securities markets and the securities
business.4" Adaptability, however, is not necessarily a virtue, especially
when social constructs are so malleable and so readily influenced by politics and emotion. We must turn, then, to the question of whether the
rule has outlived its usefulness and should therefore be repealed and re43. For a good survey of the new economics literature, see Stephen F. LeRoy, Efficient Capital Markets and Martingales,27 J. Econ. Literature 1583 (1989).

44. Much of this literature is reviewed in Robert J. Shiller, Market Volatility (1989).
A succinct description of a plausible version of noise theory is set forth in Andrei Shleifer
& Lawrence H. Summers, The Noise TraderApproach to Finance,J. Econ. Persp., Spring

1990, at 19.
It may be of interest to note that one scholar has in fact analogized the use of the
efficient market hypothesis to having a "near-death experience" in the economics literature. See Peter Fortune, Stock Market Efficiency: An Autopsy?, New Eng. Econ. Rev.,

Mar.-Apr. 1991, at 17, 35.
45. It is probably not coincidental that the diffusion of market-trusting norms into the
law was roughly contemporaneous with the dramatic increase in stock prices over most
of the 1980s, along with the careful placement of market-oriented thinkers, such as Frank
Easterbrook and Richard Posner, into the federal judiciary.
46. See Carolyn K. Brancato, InstitutionalInvestors and Corporate America: Conflicts and Resolutions-An Overview of the Role of InstitutionalInvestors in Capital Markets and CorporateGovernance: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate
Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1989).

47. This more populist phase would in some ways be reminiscent of what Robert
Clark refers to as the first phase of capitalism, in which the image of the "robber baron"
became vivid-albeit in a very changed political environment. See Clark, supra note 20,
at 56-2.
48. See supra part II.
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placed by a series of more precise statutory and regulatory initiatives.
The call for the repeal of Rule lOb-5, which was most recently echoed by
David Ratner,4 9 has been heard periodically over the last two decades.
It, in fact, constituted a significant part of the American Law Institute's
ill-fated Federal Securities Code.5 0
The arguments for repealing Rule lOb-5 are formidable. One may
plausibly contend that since the 1940s, our understanding of the securities marketplace has evolved to such a point where, as with a fine lens, we
can now view matters with sufficient clarity as to allow ourselves to formulate sensitive policy predictions that are designed to achieve optimal
results. Indeed, few who have any substantial experience in this area
(myself included) are without ideas for distinct improvements over the
current state of affairs.
Even conceding this, however, we must pause at the daunting nature
of the task. Do the policy-makers really know enough about the investing process to do much more than guess at the costs and benefits of reform? My suspicion is that we actually know frighteningly little; rather,
Rule lOb-5's intellectual wobble5 1 is the product not only of politics and
emotion in the face of marketplace change, but the lack of convincing
insight into the objective reality of investing. Although we have mounds
of facts and figures and a reasonable sense of who the players are, their
thoughts and motivations are dimly illuminated. The process of investing remains a great mystery, inviting the sort of volatile cultural speculation we have observed. The New York Stock Exchange can still be seen
both as capitalism's cathedral and its casino on the Hudson.
In the early 1970s, there was interest in studying investor behavior
seriously, using the tools of psychology and sociology.52 The SEC staff,
building on its field study of the securities markets in the 1960s, looked
closely and systematically at institutional investor behavior-the context
in which buying and selling decisions are made, and the conflicts that
49. See David L. Ratner, Repeal SEC's Anti-FraudRule, Legal Times, May 25, 1992,
at 22.
50. The Federal Securities Code (Am. Law Inst. 1980) was a comprehensive recodification of the securities laws which failed politically for a number of reasons, even though
it had succeeded in getting the backing of the American Law Institute, the SEC, and a
fair segment of the private bar. See Louis Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation
40-44 (2d ed. 1988). Among other things, the Code took too long to prepare: by the time
it was finished, many of its best ideas had already been adopted by the courts and the
SEC in specific initiatives, and the case law had shifted (especially under Rule lOb-5) to a
more conservative posture, reducing the need for revision in many people's eyes.
51. The term "wobble" is used to capture the vacillating, sometimes random nature
of the case law. See Lea Brilmayer, Wobble, or the Death of Error,59 S. Cal. L. Rev. 363,
366 (1986).
52. See Paul Slovic et al., Analyzing the Use of Information in Investment Decision
Making: A Methodological Proposal, 45 J. Bus. 283 (1972); Paul Slovic, Analyzing the
Expert Judge: A Descriptive Study of a Stockbroker's Decision Processes, 53 J. Applied
Psychol. 255 (1969).
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occur.53 By the middle of the decade, however, the arguments in favor of
the efficient market hypothesis had become sufficiently dominant so as to
result in the dismissal of behavioral studies as irrelevant.' Indeed, if one
accepts the premise that market forces remove all significant behavioral

imperfections, a study of nonsystematic flaws or problems should not
further an analysis of the market. Rather, event studies-the use of regression analysis to determine the response of the market as a whole to

new information or events 55-became

the methodology for studying in-

vestment behavior. The validity of the efficiency hypothesis assumed,
economic theory could provide all the necessary direction for policy reform. Indeed, by the mid-1980s, scholars had put forth with confidence
a wide-ranging program for refining or revising Rule l0b-5, 56 and had

gained a substantial following at the SEC, in the courts, and (especially)

in the business community.5 7
As noted earlier, however, the last few years have demonstrated a loss
of both cultural and scholarly confidence in the marketplace ideal. Noise
theory has become the new fad, offering a more chaotic image of market
behavioral flaws that do not readily wash out in real financial markets.5"
With these new developments, the need to revisit the behavioral questions has grown, and we now recognize that nearly two decades have
been lost-though by no means wasted5 9 --in the pursuit of a further un53. See Institutional Investor Study Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission, H.R. Doe. No. 64, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1 (1971).
54. In his important work in the 1970s, Homer Kripke speculated about the extent to
which individual investors made use of disclosure documents at all-an interesting behavioral question-but essentially dismissed the question by shifting concern to marketwide behavior as the proper focus of disclosure policy. See Homer Kripke, The SEC And
Corporate Disclosure: Regulation In Search Of A Purpose 97-107 (1979); Homer
Kripke, The Myth of the Informed Layman, 28 Bus. Law. 631, 636 (1973) (minimal use
of disclosure documents by investors).
55. See Stephen J. Brown & Jerold B. Warner, Using Daily Stock Returns The Case
of Event Studies, 14 J. Fin. Econ. 3, 3-4 (1985). Through the use of event studies, the
effects of regulation on a particular firm may be determined by separately analyzing the
stock price movements that are attributable to either the market as a whole or to industry
segments. The unaccounted-for return on investment is the "abnormal" return. See id.
at 4. Similar techniques can be applied to groups of firms, provided that there is a sample
of unaffected firms that are reasonably comparable in all other respects. See id. For a
noteworthy application-which had an important influence in policy formulation-see
Ronald Gilson, Evaluating Dual Class Common Stock." The Relevance of Substitutes, 73
Va. L. Rev. 807 (1987).
56. The most comprehensive program can be found in Frank H. Easterbrook &
Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law 276-314 (1991); see also
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Optimal Damages in Securities Cases, 52 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 611 (1985) (suggesting a framework for computing damages in securities
cases).
57. See, e.g., Securities Act Release No. 33-6499, 48 Fed. Reg. 52,889, 52,892 (Nov.
23, 1983) (Securities and Exchange Commission support for refining or revising Rule
lOb-5); supra text accompanying notes 37-42 (court support for revision).
58. See supra text accompanying notes 44-45.
59. The process of hypothesis formulation and testing has yielded a far more sophisticated understanding of the workings of the markets, even though the ultimate conclusion
may be that of significant chaos. In addition, it is generally acknowledged that the mar-
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derstanding of the behavioral mechanisms of the investing process.
First, it must be noted that we lack a systematic, empirical understanding of how investors make decisions-a crucial component to assessing the materiality and reliance portions of Rule lOb-5. To what
extent are trading decisions influenced by noninformational factors?
Two social scientists at Duke and the University of North Carolina, William O'Barr and John Conley, have recently done interesting work that
addresses these questions.' Using the field work methods of cultural
anthropology, they have explored the investment behavior of pension
fund managers.6 1 Consistent with the new skepticism, they found that
traditions, egos and personal relationships heavily affected managerial
decision-making, competing with-though by no means excluding-the
use of fundamental financial analysis. 2 This is a step toward greater
understanding, though one that suggests that the objective reality we
seek may be far less than coherent and predictable. Comparable work,
coupled with empirical testing, still needs to be done on a multitude a
factors that may influence the decision-making processes of investors.
Among the factors that remain to be explored are the role of investment
research, the influence of the financial media, and the effects of the broker-customer relationship.
Also lacking is a solid perspective on the behavior of the primary subjects of Rule lOb-5's reach-issuer managers and their associates. Our
society has long believed in the presence of a fairly sensitive correlation
between legal rules and corporate manager behavior. This belief undoubtedly predated the efficiency paradigm, although it was substantially
strengthened by that model's primacy. Indeed, Rule lOb-5's behaviorshaping capacity has been widely assumed, as reflected in its scienter and
duty components. 63 But here again, there may be reason to question
whether we have a sufficient understanding of the behavior of issuer managers and their associates to support a thorough analysis. There may be
reason to doubt, for example, whether corporate managers have the cognitive capacity to recognize clearly the potential for harm in what they
say and do--a possibility that would cause us to rethink the benefit
kets behave efficiently-at least to some degree. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H.
Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 Va. L. Rev. 549, 551 (1984).
60. See William M. O'Barr & John M. Conley, Fortune & Folly: The Wealth and
Power of Institutional Investing (1992). The O'Barr and Conley research is summarized
in John M. Conley & William M. O'Barr, The Culture of Capital: An Anthropological
Investigation of Institutional Investment, 70 N.C. L. Rev. 823 (1992), and critiqued in
Geoffrey P. Miller, The Culture of Capital. Comments on Conley & O'Barr,71 N.C. L.
Rev. 501 (1993).
61. See O'Barr & Conley, supra note 60, at 74-94.
62. See id.
63. See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 201-06 (1976) (scienter component); United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 570-71 (2d Cir. 1991) (duty
component).
64. See generally Irving Janis & Leon Mann, Decision-Making: A Psychological
Analysis of Conflict, Choice and Commitment (1977) (discussing why-and how-bad
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calculus of the present doctrinal framework.6 5 Important work also remains to be done on the influence of Rule lOb-5 and comparable legal
rules on high-level corporate decisions in terms of how legal advice is
rendered. My sense is that while the law has less of an influence on dayto-day managerial behavior than we have traditionally believed, there are
some settings-highly "lawyered" transactions and events-where its effect is excessive in light of a variety of behavioral factors. Not the least of
these may be the tendency of the lawyers to maximize their own control
and influence in the decision-making process by overstating both the
legal risk associated with Rule lOb-5 and their ability to deal with it."
All in all, the diffusion of legal knowledge in the corporate area may in
fact be a more interesting and mysterious process than our current belief
structure acknowledges.
If what we do not know about the investing process is indeed this
great, then Rule lOb-5's wobbliness is understandable, maybe even appropriate. We may still be early enough in our intellectual journey so as
to render appealing- especially when one considers the rapidity of external change and the enforcement benefits of indeterminacy-the fits and
starts that characterize the present common-law process. A tentative,
fluid form of law suits agnosticism quite well.
Whether or not a retention of the open-ended character of Rule lOb-5
is substantively proper, I am quite convinced that a complete revision is
highly unlikely. In part, the reasons for this conclusion are standard
ones: the traditional fear of losing flexibility in the enforcement of the
securities laws, and the less-often discussed fear of opening up the enforcement "crown jewel" of securities regulation to the vagaries and special interests of the political process.67 To these reasons, we may add the
current lack of confidence in any coherent view of the investing process,
and the rapid pace of change in the structure of markets. In addition, I
believe that a more subtle factor is operative.
I have long been curious about the prevalence and persistence of ambidecisions are made). I have recently completed a project that considers the claim that
attorneys have an imperfect cognitive ability to identify client fraud, based on the teachings of cognitive dissonance and commitment theory. See generally Donald C.
Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers? A BehavioralInquiry into Lawyers' Responsibility
for Clients' Fraud, 46 Vand. L. Rev. 75 (1993).
65. See supra text accompanying note 34.
66. The diffusion of law is an interesting and underexplored concept. Common sense
suggests that, consciously or not, lawyers have an incentive to describe the law to their
clients in a way that maximizes their own advantage-creating a classic moral hazard
problem. For some thoughts in this direction from the standpoint of organization theory,
see Lauren B. Edelman et al., Professional Construction of Law: The Inflated Threat of
Wrongful Discharge, 26 Law & Soc'y Rev. 47 (1992). The tendency to distort the legal
situation is also noted in John Flood's study of the corporate lawyer. See John Flood,
Doing Business: The Managementof Uncertainty in Lawyers' Work, 25 Law & Soc'y Rev.
41, 63-66 (1991).
67. In many ways, this was a principal reason for the SEC's only grudging endorsement of the Federal Securities Code, and its lack of willingness to lobby strongly for it.
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guity in various legal settings-whether it be in statutes, rules, or private
contracts. Conventional theory holds that, apart from those instances
when it is the product of simple carelessness, ambiguous legal words and
phrases should only be used when the transaction costs associated with
further refinement exceed the likely benefits to be derived from the clarification.6 8 Normally, ambiguity is preferred only to the extent that fu-

ture circumstances cannot be anticipated with reasonable precision, and
no express ex ante risk allocation makes sense. This offers one explanation for why a preference for ambiguity would be apparent in the drafts-

manship of Rule lOb-5.
Nevertheless, this explanation may not account in entirety for our tolerance of the vagueness of Rule lOb-5. Ambiguous language is frequently chosen not because of imperfect information, but because it is a
way of deferring to an unpredictable future the question of who wins and
who loses. It constitutes something of a lawyers' bet, facilitating compromise in an otherwise zero-sum setting. Research in cognitive psychology moreover suggests an additional reason. People---especially
successful ones, imbued with high levels of self-esteem (like many lawyers)-habitually tend to view ambiguous cues through rose-colored
glasses, seeing more opportunity than risk.6 9 In many negotiation settings (whether the subject matter being drafted is a law, a rule, or a contract), ambiguity allows both sides to walk away with little sense of loss,
with both sides wishfully seeing the agreed-to term in a hopeful light, or
at least projecting such a benevolent interpretation to their
constituencies.70
Rule lOb-5 may well survive in part because of this adaptive capacity.
68. For an illustration of this point, with respect to legislative drafting, see McNollgast, Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in Statutory Interpretation, 80
Geo. L.J. 705, 714-15 (1992); as to the choice of language in the private contracting
literature, see Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: The
Analysis of the Interaction Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 Cal. L. Rev.
261 (1985).
69. See Fiske & Taylor, supra note 4, at 215 (discussing individuals' perceptions of
future events). This is a strong component in gambling behavior. See Thomas Gilovich,
Biased Evaluation and Persistencein Gambling, 44 J. Pets. & Soc. Psychol. 1110 (1983).
70. It is interesting that when reforms of Rule lob-5 are proposed, they tend to be
almost as ambiguous and open ended as the rule itself. In 1987 and 1988, an ambitious
effort was undertaken to define insider trading, and it received considerable support from
the SEC, the private bar, and some members of Congress. Interestingly, the rule was
drafted more to create the illusion of predictability that actual predictability: the duty to
disclose, for instance, would depend on the presence of the "wrongful" misuse of information, i.e., that which constituted (directly or indirectly) "theft, conversion, misappropriation or a breach of any fiduciary, contractual, employment, personal or other
relationship of trust and confidence." Improper Activities in the Securities Industry:
Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Securities of the Senate Committee on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 57 (1987). One has the distinct impression that this sort of compromise was reached largely because it allowed the more
conservative members of the drafting group to see in the proposed formulation more
clarity than was really there, while it allowed the more enforcement-oriented members
the ability to see continued flexibility and force.
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Lawyers-who are overwhelmingly responsible for the vitality of the
rule, whether they are acting as judges, bureaucrats, advocates, or lobbyists-tend to view the rule from a litigation perspective, assessing likely
outcomes in foreseeable cases. Regardless of where a lawyer's self-interest lies-be it in the case of the SEC and its staff, the Business Roundtable, the securities industry, or the private bar-it is possible to look at
Rule lOb-5 in mildly hopeful terms, and to see some lingering opportunity for evolution toward desired objectives. Indeed, the rule's jurisprudence has thus far been broad enough to encompass aggressive investor
protection, protection against strike suits, flexibility and clarity-all
roughly at the same time, and without much apology for the inconsistency. Few statutory or rule-based reforms would offer such promise to
all the affected parties; if, for example, the scope of the rule were to become defined with greater precision, any given interest would face a
greater risk of unrecoverable loss. Perhaps, then, Rule lOb-5's ability to
adapt to indeterminate future environments is a political survival trait as
well as an intellectual one.

